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Abstract
This paper develops a model of local income tax competition with a progressive tax
scheme and a built-in fiscal equalization scheme. Both aspects are central to policy
makers: The progressivity for equity reasons, and the fiscal equalization to prevent a race
to the bottom and to limit the degree of segregation of households according to income.
The model is calibrated to the metropolitan area of Zurich (Switzerland), and policy
evaluations reveal that a progressive tax scheme as the basis for local tax competition
causes strong segregating forces that can only to some extent be compensated by the
fiscal equalization scheme.
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1 Introduction
In countries with a federal structure, local governments have at least some autonomy on the
spending- or expenditure-side of their budget. Whether or not such decentralization is beneficial
or what degree of decentralization would be efficient, however, is the subject of a long-standing
debate. In this paper, I contribute to the discussion by offering two extensions that are central
in the context of local income tax competition: First, I allow for a progressive income tax
scheme, for which the residents of each municipality vote on a tax rate multiplier to determine
the size of the municipal budget; and, second, I allow for a fiscal equalization scheme that
redistributes money from the rich to the poor municipalities.
This setup reflects the implementation of fiscal decentralization in many federal countries.
For example, it corresponds to the situation in Switzerland, where the high degree of decen-
tralized government autonomy is widely believed to be one of the cornerstones for the well-
functioning of the country.1 The empirical literature shows that the municipalities engage in
tax competition, which induces rich households to sort into the municipalities with lower tax
rates (see, e.g., Feld & Kirchgaessner 2001, Schmidheiny 2006a). Roller & Schmidheiny (2016)
look at the effective average and marginal tax rates of Swiss households. They find that the
redistributive character of using progressive taxes is weakened – if not reversed – in the pres-
ence of tax competition, simply because the rich can avoid taxes by residing in municipalities
with low tax rates.
These observations are in line with theoretical models with residence-based tax competi-
tion, that also predict a segregation of the population according to income and claim that
this sorting may cause significant disparities in municipality characteristics, which include tax
rates, public good provision and housing prices.2 For the case of property tax competition,
1In fact, the degree of autonomy at Switzerland’s local levels of government is extraordinary: Municipalities
raised more than 45bn CHF in 2014, which are almost 30% of all public revenues (cantons: 50%, central
government: 20%). They gather more than 35% of total revenue from income taxation, which is about two
thirds of their fiscal revenues and constitutes the most important single source of income. For further details,
see the “Finanzstatistik” (available at https://www.efv.admin.ch/efv/de/home/themen/finanzstatistik/
berichterstattung.html, last accessed June 2017).
2For most of the models, however, the existence of a (segregating) equilibrium cannot be ensured. An
exception is a series of papers which follow the seminal contribution by Gravel & Thoron (2007), who present a
model in which income segregation occurs if, and only if, the publicly provided good is either a gross substitute
or a gross complement to the private consumption for every household. Gravel & Oddou (2014) generalize
this result for the existence of a land market. For the case of income tax competition, Oddou (2016) extends
this approach to the case of income tax competition and a publicly provided good that exhibits spillovers, and
finds that the conditions identified in Gravel & Thoron (2007) remain sufficient. However, this work is purely
theoretical and largely lacks calibration, policy evaluations or other empirically relevant analysis.
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see, e.g., Epple & Platt (1998), Epple et al. (2001), and Calabrese et al. (2006). For the case
of income tax competition, see, e.g., Calabrese (2001), who investigates the (limited) ability of
linear income taxation for within-jurisdictional redistribution in the presence of tax competi-
tion; and Schmidheiny (2006b), who calibrates a model to the metropolitan area around the
city of Zurich. Schmidheiny assumes that the publicly provided good does not create inter-
jurisdictional spillovers and is perfectly rival in consumption, he considers a linear tax rate
scheme, and he ignores the existence of transfers between jurisdictions. The present paper can
be interpreted as an extension to Schmidheiny’s model in that it relaxes all of these restrictions.
On normative grounds, and without further restrictions such as asymmetric information,
income tax competition is inefficient – not least due to the resulting inefficient distribution of the
households. Besides this ‘intra-municipal free-riding’, and for the case of a spillover-generating
publicly provided good with imperfect rivalry in consumption, Kuhlmey & Hintermann (2016)
identify two other inefficiencies: An imperfect redistribution of income between households
and municipalities, and free-riding on the provision of the publicly provided good in the other
municipalities (‘inter-municipal free-riding’). For a good with intermediate levels of spillovers
and rivalry, they quantify each of these three inefficiencies to account for about one third of
the welfare loss when compared to the decisions of a utilitarian social planner with access to
individualized lump-sum taxes.
To limit the negative consequences of tax competition to a politically acceptable limit and
to ensure a lower limit of the local revenue capacity, policy makers have different options at
their disposal. All of them can be employed to restrict the degree of competition and therefore
to prevent a race to the bottom: Command and control strategies (of, e.g., tax rates or the
definition of the tax scheme), subsidies for publicly provided goods and services, or matching
grants from a higher-level government. A combination of these instruments can be used to
design a fiscal equalization scheme (FES). In such a scheme, the central government forces rich
municipalities to pay, while offering subsidies to the poor municipalities (such that the rich
municipalities become less rich and the poor, less poor). As a consequence, employing FESs
should align the distinctive characteristics of the included municipalities, in the sense that the
heterogeneity of municipality characteristics will be reduced in their presence.
Previous approaches and methods for assessing FESs were mostly limited to the presence
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of capital tax competition.3 In the context of income tax competition, the previous approaches
inherently ignored adjustments in prices and quantities, and – most importantly – migration.4
This is why I will – in the context of a calibrated general equilibrium model of municipal
income tax competition with a progressive tax scheme – gradually remove a fiscal equalization
scheme to see to what extent the FES effectively mitigates the segregation of households and
contributes towards aligning municipality characteristics. As a second policy evaluation, I
will change the tax scheme, which is exogenous to the municipalities (which only set a tax
rate multiplier) and which is decided upon by the upper level of government, to identify the
interaction of the FES with this instrument, and thereby quantify the effect of progression on
segregation.
To perform the policy evaluations sketched above, I build on the model of Kuhlmey &
Hintermann (2016), but extend it in three dimensions: I add taste heterogeneity with respect
to the publicly provided good, I model the local fiscal equalization scheme (as it is implemented
in the canton of Zurich), and I allow for a progressive (cantonal) tax code. I will then calibrate
this model to the metropolitan area of Zurich. Municipalities in the canton of Zurich are (1)
restricted to set a linear multiplier on the cantonal progressive income tax scheme; and (2),
depending on their relative fiscal capacity, they also receive money from or pay money to a
FES, which aims at aligning the fiscal capacity.5
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I present and describe the
model, which is calibrated to the metropolitan area of Zurich in Section 3. In Section 4, I
3The list of contributions includes Bucovetsky & Smart (2006), who show that a tax base equalization scheme
helps the central government to establish equity and efficiency, even with an endogenous capital supply. For the
case of German business taxation at the local level, Buettner (2006) unravels the incentive structure implied by
the complex interplay of vertical and horizontal equalization instruments implemented at the municipal level.
And Egger et al. (2010) examine the German municipalities’ ability to effectively change their fiscal capacity
in order to choose one of two alternative transfer schemes.
4For example in Switzerland, the canton of Zurich applies a tax base equalization scheme. To evaluate
its efficacy, the statistical office computes counterfactual tax rate multipliers, defined as the multiplier on the
progressive cantonal tax code that is required in one municipality in the absence of the FES to maintain
the given level of expenditure, if both the distribution of households and the level of public provision remain
unchanged. This approach, however, is incomplete, as it ignores all second-round effects such as migration
responses and adjustments to the level of public provision and housing prices; i.e., the general equilibrium
effects of the FES. See “Handbuch Zu¨rcher Finanzausgleich”, available at http://www.finanzausgleich.zh.
ch/internet/microsites/finanzausgleich/de/grundlagen/unterlagen.html, last accessed June 2017.
5Following Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002), a FES can be aimed at aligning either the tax revenue or the tax base
of municipalities. A tax revenue equalization scheme targets (fully) equalizing the level of local expenditure
by aligning the per capita revenue. A tax base equalization scheme (which is also sometimes referred to as a
capacity equalization scheme), to the contrary, is designed to enable poorer municipalities to provide a desired
minimum quality and quantity of goods and services to their citizens, while still allowing for heterogeneity in
terms of disposable revenue.
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gradually remove the fiscal equalization scheme to assess its impact and also discuss changes
in the cantonal progressive tax code. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, I first describe the general setup of the model; then I specify the production
technology, the preferences, and the budget balance conditions before showing some equilibrium
properties.
2.1 Basic setup and structure
The model economy consists of j = 1, . . . , J municipalities. Each is defined by three charac-
teristics: A housing price pj, a tax rate (multiplier) tj, and the level of public consumption
gj. The tax rate is subject to majority voting and determines (together with the tax base
of the municipality) the level of public consumption. The housing price depends on the ag-
gregate demand for and the aggregate supply of housing, such that the characteristics of the
municipalities depend on the endogenous residential choices of households.
Households gain utility from consuming the publicly provided good gj, housing h
j, and
a numeraire consumption good xj.6 They differ with respect to an exogenous income level
y ∈ [y, y] and a preference parameter α ∈ [0, 1], which describes the preference for the publicly
provided good. Both are continuously distributed according to the probability density func-
tions f(y) and f(α), respectively. As a consequence, a continuum of households exists in a
two-dimensional space such that a household is characterized by the pair (y, α). Migration is
costless, which implies that a household of type (y, α) resides in municipality j if the household
prefers the triplet (pj, tj, gj) to any other triplet (pi, ti, gi) ∀ i 6= j. If a household is indifferent
between any two municipalities, it chooses its residence by chance. For more detailed expla-
nations concerning the heterogeneity of households, be referred to Schmidheiny (2006b) and
Epple & Platt (1998).
To further illustrate the decision-making of households, I introduce an indirect utility func-
6The municipality index j is used both as a subscript and a superscript. As a subscript, it indicates the
endogenous variables of the municipalities. When used as a superscript, it indicates that the level of the
respective variable depends on the locational choice of a household. The affordable optimal levels of housing
and numeraire consumption, for example, depend on the municipalities’ housing prices and tax rates.
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tion. It is the result of maximizing a household’s utility function U(·) subject to its budget
balance constraint with respect to its private consumption bundle. Mathematically,
V (pj, tj, gj; y, α) = max
xj ,hj
U(xj, hj, gj;α) s.t. y = tjb(y) + x
j + pjh
j (1)
describes the utility that the household (y, α) achieves if it resides in municipality j for a given
set of municipality characteristics. The budget balance constraint allows for a progressive tax
scheme: The tax rate tj is multiplied by the tax base b(y), which allows for a progressive tax
regime (see Section 3.1). The case of linear taxation is covered as the special case of b(y) = a ·y
and a constant.
The model is in equilibrium if the following three conditions are satisfied, which are con-
ceptually the same as in Kuhlmey & Hintermann (2016).
Migration equilibrium. No household has an incentive to move and (at least weakly) prefers
the municipality it currently resides in to any other municipality.
Majority voting equilibrium. The tax rate multiplier tj in every municipality constitutes
a majority voting equilibrium. Without further restrictions of the household preferences
(see below), I cannot easily predict what tax rate multiplier can win a majority.
Housing market equilibrium. Housing demand equals housing supply in every municipal-
ity.
For each, I now discuss the implications and assumptions in the context of the present
paper. Concerning the housing market equilibrium, for every household, the optimal housing
demand hj(y, α) depends on the locational choice, its income and preference parameter, and
follows from the utility function (1). For the supply of housing, which I label HSj(pj), I follow
the previous literature and assume that it is supplied by absentee landlords according to a
constant returns to scale technology. Market clearing then requires that in every j
HSj(pj) = N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
hj(y, α)f(y)f(α)dαdy, (2)
where the double integral is aggregate housing demand and N total population (see below for
the definition of the integral borders).
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Concerning the migration equilibrium, the existence of an equilibrium per se cannot gener-
ally be guaranteed for this class of models. I focus on segregating equilibria in the numerical
application. Segregation implies that households self-select into municipalities such that every
municipality is inhabited by households from a single interval on the income and preference
distribution. In terms of the indirect utility function (1), this implies for any municipality j
that ∀ y ∈ [yj, yj] and ∀ α ∈ [αj(y), αj(y)]:
V (pj, tj, gj; y, α)− V (pi, ti, gi; y, α) ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j, (3)
where yj, yj and αj(y), αj(y) describe the lower and upper limits of the income and taste inter-
vals, within which households reside in municipality j. Households that are precisely at these
limits are indifferent to the neighboring municipality. They define the municipality borders in
the y-α-space by forming what is called the locus of indifferent households between any two
‘adjacent’ municipalities. All households in between these limits strictly prefer municipality j,
while all households beyond these limits strictly prefer another municipality.
With linear taxes and without a fiscal equalization scheme, Schmidheiny (2002) shows
that any equilibrium is characterized by perfect segregation, if the utility is described by a
Stone-Geary utility function with at least one strictly positive level of subsistence consump-
tion. Kuhlmey & Hintermann (2016) show that allowing for spillovers and imperfect rivalry
in the consumption of the publicly provided good does not require stricter assumptions about
preferences. In Appendix B, I discuss how this set of conditions can be refined to remain com-
patible with segregation in the presence of a progressive tax scheme. I cannot establish a formal
definition for a set of necessary conditions that are required to guarantee income segregation
(if an equilibrium is found). This implies that I need to check whether the implicitly assumed
segregation in the resulting equilibrium is indeed incentive-compatible. Incentive compatibility
(IC) has two components in this context: In the case of the moving equilibrium condition, IC
means that only the actual border-households are indifferent between any two municipalities,
and that those who are not indifferent prefer the municipality that they ‘belong’ to over any
other municipality; in the case of the majority voting equilibrium condition (see below), IC
implies that the households on one side of the locus of median voters all prefer a higher tax rate,
while the households on the other side of the locus prefer a lower tax rate. In Appendix D.1 I
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show that the baseline calibration to the Zurich metropolitan area, that I present in the next
section, is incentive-compatible.
Concerning the majority voting equilibrium, for each triplet of municipality characteris-
tics (pj, tj, gj) which satisfies the municipality’s budget constraint, the following holds: If the
marginal rate of substitution between any pair of municipality characteristics from this triplet
changes monotonically in both income y and the preference for the publicly provided good α,
there exists a locus of households in the y-α-space for which this pair is optimal. Take the
pair (tj, gj) as an example. If 50% of voters prefer a higher tj and 50% a lower tj, then this
locus is called the median voter locus (quite similar to the approach used above for the locus of
indifferent housholds). If it exists, there is no other tj-gj-pair which would win a majority vote
against the median voters’ optimal tj-gj-pair and therefore constitutes a majority voting equi-
librium for a given population in the municipality. In Section B.2 in the Appendix, I discuss
the necessary and sufficient conditions on the households’ preferences to ensure the existence
of a median voter locus in the presence of progressive taxes.
I assume that, when voting, households take the distribution of the households (as well
as the households’ level of housing demand) as given; i.e., are myopic with respect to the
migrational consequences induced by changing the tax rate (for a further discussion of voter
myopia, see Epple et al. 2001, Kuhlmey & Hintermann 2016). Moreover, in the presence
of inter-municipal spillovers, I assume that households correctly anticipate the supply of the
publicly provided good in the other municipalities. As a consequence, the optimal tax rate
multiplier of household (y, α) follows from
max
tj
V (pj, tj, gj(tj); y, α), (4)
where gj(tj) indicates that the public consumption level is determined by the level of tj via the
budget balance constraint of the municipality and the production technology, which I specify
in Section 2.2. Note that I restrict the voting process to determine a tax rate multiplier (and
therefore not to determine the progressivity of the tax scheme per se). This one-dimensionality
of the voting decision allows me to keep track of households’ preferences and to identify potential
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segregation patterns. The equilibrium tax rate is then implicitly defined by
N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αmj (y)
αj(y)
f(y)f(α)dαdy =
1
2
Nj, (5)
where αmj (y) defines the locus of median voters in j. It is the solution of (4) solved for α and
with a tax rate chosen such that (5) holds. Nj ≡ N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
f(y)f(α)dαdy is the population
in j, where N is total population.
2.2 Revenue and expenditure of the local governments
After having sketched the basic setup and the general structure of the model, I now specify
the production technology of the publicly provided good gj and the budget balance of the local
governments, which includes the fiscal equalization scheme.
The amount of the publicly provided good available for consumption in municipality j is
given by
gj =
Gj + σ
∑
i 6=j Gi(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ , (6)
where Gj denotes the level of production of the good in j. The level of production, Gj,
is determined by the budget balance constraint of the municipality, which is derived below
in (10). Each municipality spends its entire revenue on Gj, such that we can think of it
as being the bundle of goods and services that are actually (and on average) provided by
municipalities. To capture the characteristics of this bundle, I allow for inter-jurisdictional
spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption, where σ describes the degree to which the
public provision ‘spills out’ of the other municipalities into j, ν describes the degree to which
the citizens of the other municipalities ‘spill into’ j to consume there, and ρ describes the degree
of rivalry in consumption. All parameters are meaningfully defined between [0, 1], whereas not
all combinations make sense economically. For further details, see Kuhlmey & Hintermann
(2016), who introduced this specification.
To determine the (net) revenue of each municipality, I consider two elements: Tax revenues
and payments from or into a fiscal equalization scheme that is imposed by some higher level of
government. The particular form of both are due to the actual situation in the canton of Zurich,
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to which I calibrate the model in Section 3.1. Tax revenue stems from taxing the income of
the residents of each municipality. Each municipality decides on setting one multiplier, tj, on
the tax base b(y), which is a function of actual income y. The tax base determines the relative
tax liabilities of households differing in income, whereas the level of taxes is not yet defined.
Using this specification, tj > 0 is the meaningful limitation on the tax rate multiplier. A value
of tj = 1 means that a household with income y and which is residing in j has to pay municipal
taxes that exactly correspond to b(y).7 Note that the interpretation of tj has therefore changed
compared to the linear-tax case previously considered in the literature, where b(y) = y implied
that the tax rate describes the share of income that every household has to pay.8 For the case
at hand, the aggregate tax base of a municipality is given by
TBj = N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
b(y)f(y)f(α)dαdy. (7)
Multiplied with the tax rate multiplier tj, this determines the tax revenue of a municipality.
The municipality-specific per capita level of the tax base is labeled the fiscal capacity (FCj)
of a municipality such that
FCj =
TBj
Nj
. (8)
This measure determines how much municipality j pays into or receives from the fiscal equal-
ization scheme (FES).
The second element that I consider to determine a municipality’s (net) income is a tax base
equalization scheme at the municipal level. Such a scheme has two effects: On the one hand,
it lifts the revenue of poor municipalities to a certain lower bound; on the other hand, it takes
a certain percentage from the fiscal capacity of rich municipalities that exceeds some upper
bound of the fiscal capacity. More precisely, the net subsidy of municipality j, labeled FESj,
7Consider an example: The tax base of a poor household is 5% of its income, whereas a rich household’s tax
base amounts to 10%. If the municipality-specific tax rate multiplier is tj = 1.1, the municipal tax liability of
the aforementioned households amounts to 5.5% and 11% of their respective incomes. Both average tax rates
are 10% higher when compared to tj = 1, though the poor household’s rate increased by only 0.5 percentage
points and the rate of the rich household by 1 percentage point.
8It is meaningfully defined between 0 and 1, where 0 means no taxes and 1 means that the tax liability is
as high as the income itself.
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can be defined as follows:
FESj =

Aj < 0, if υ · FCavg < FCj
0, if ` · FCavg < FCj < υ · FCavg
Zj > 0, if FCj < ` · FCavg,
(9)
with Aj ≡ τNj (υ · FCavg − FCj) ,
Zj ≡ Nj (` · FCavg − FCj) , and
FCavg ≡
∑
j FCj
J
,
where FCavg is the average fiscal capacity of all municipalities in the canton. A municipality
receives the subsidy Zj if FCj < ` ·FCavg. The parameter ` determines the lower bound of the
fiscal capacity to which the municipalities’ revenue is topped up, and therefore marks a lower
bound of revenue for municipalities. And the municipality has to pay Aj if FCj > υ · FCavg,
with υ > `. This inequality states that if the municipality’s fiscal capacity exceeds υ · 100%
of the average fiscal capacity, the municipality has to pay a fraction τ ∈ [0, 1] of its fiscal
capacity in excess of this upper limit (haircut). Municipalities with a fiscal capacity between
the lower and upper bound of the average neither receive payments from or owe payments to
the FES. This setup leaves the scheme not necessarily balanced. The reason for this is that
the sum of payments to the scheme (
∑
j Aj) are not directly linked to the sum of subsidies
(
∑
j Zj), such that it is the choice of the parameters (`, υ, τ) that together with the distribution
of households quantify the payments and budget balance cannot be guaranteed. The central
government covers a deficit (and receives excess payments).
I am now able to define the (net) revenue of each municipality as tjTBj + FESj such that
the budget balance constraint of municipality j implies
Gj = tjTBj + FESj. (10)
2.3 Functional forms and solving the model
For the calibration, I rely on a Stone-Geary utility function, which I specify in Appendix A. I
am not able to solve this model analytically for its equilibrium values. Instead, I am left with
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a set of 3J equations and 3J unknowns, who form the basis for the numerical solutions from
the next sections: The equilibrium conditions are J housing market clearing conditions (2),
J majority voting equilibrium conditions (5), and J times the calculation of the consumption
levels of the publicly provided good (6). The variables that I cannot solve for are the respective
municipality characteristics pj, tj, and gj. Note that the J − 1 loci of indifferent households
at the municipality ‘borders’ in the y-α-space, the loci of indifferent voters, as well as all the
other variables (such as Gj, TBj, FESj) are implicitly defined for a given set of municipal-
ity characteristics. For the Stone-Geary-specification, they are derived in Section A.2 in the
Appendix.
3 Calibration
In this section, I first specify the fiscal instruments relevant at the municipal level. Then, I
specify the model presented in Section 2 for two groups of municipalities (J = 2) that form
the metropolitan area around the city of Zurich and discuss the choices of the unobserved
parameters. Finally, I present the equilibrium properties for this baseline calibration and
assess its performance.
3.1 Fiscal instruments at the cantonal level
I am interested in how households self-select into municipalities. Each municipality is char-
acterized by its specific combination of the housing price pj, the linear tax rate multiplier
tj, and the level of public consumption gj. Abstracting from a ‘home-bias’ or other frictions
concerning relocation decisions, households choose the combination that suits them best. The
municipalities, however, are not completely free to choose their tax regime. Two fiscal instru-
ments that are determined at the cantonal level are crucial for this analysis: the municipal
system of income taxation and the fiscal equalization scheme for the municipalities (FES).
In Switzerland, every household is subject to income taxation at the federal, cantonal, and
municipal level. In my analysis, I am interested in the taxation at the local level. The municipal
tax base b(y) of a household with income y is the cantonal tax liability of this household, and
therefore determined by the cantonal tax scheme. The municipal tax liability is then given as
12
Table 1: Income tax scheme for the canton of Zurich (2014).
Basic rate Married rate
Taxable Tax Taxable Tax Marginal tax rate
income liability income liability for add. income
in CHF in %
6,700 0 13,500 0 2
11,400 93 19,600 121 3
16,100 234 27,300 352 4
23,700 538 36,700 728 5
33,000 1,003 47,400 1,263 6
43,700 1,645 61,300 2,097 7
56,100 2,513 92,100 4,253 8
73,000 3,865 122,900 6,717 9
105,500 6,789 169,300 10,892 10
137,700 10,010 224,700 16,432 11
188,700 15,620 284,800 23,043 12
254,900 23,562 354,100 31,359 13
tjb(y) for a household with income y. Note that tj is the same for all households within one
municipality and b(y) is the same for all municipalities in the canton. The evaluation of tj for a
household with a given income y therefore crucially depends on b(y). Zurich uses a progressive
scheme with stepwise increases in the marginal tax rate. The taxation scheme differentiates
between a ‘basic’ rate (“Grundtarif”) and a ‘married’ rate (“Verheiratetentarif”), where the
latter is also applicable to single-households with children. Both schemes are specified in
Table 1.9 The basic rate was applied to approximately 60% of the cases in 2013, and the
married rate to the remaining 40% of cases. Since a married household typically consists of at
least 2 people, it is plausible to assume that this rate affects more individuals than the base
rate, which only applies to one-person households. For the calibration, I assume that every
household is taxed according to the married rate. This biases the calibration, since I, effectively,
apply tax rates that are too low for parts of the population and therefore underestimate the
segregating consequences caused by income tax competition.10
The second fiscal instrument that the municipalities can not (directly) influence, is the
fiscal equalization scheme for the municipalities (FES). I analyze the ‘new’ FES of the canton
9See “Steuertarife” on https://www.steueramt.zh.ch/internet/finanzdirektion/ksta/de/
steuerberechnung/steuertarife.html, last accessed June 2017.
10For example, a household with a taxable income of 56,100 CHF has to pay 2,513 CHF and face a marginal
tax rate of 8% if taxed according to the basic rate. Applying the married rate reveals a tax liability of
1, 263 + 0.06 · (56, 100− 47, 400) = 1, 785 CHF and a marginal tax rate of 6%.
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of Zurich that was introduced in 2012.11 In 2015, the FES paid out 1,134 million CHF, which
corresponds to roughly 10% of the total expenditures at the municipal level.12 The payments of
the rich municipalities into that scheme amounted to 667 million CHF, the rest being covered
by the canton.
The FES has three instruments: (1) transfers based on resource disparities (“Resourcen-
ausgleich”), (2) compensation for specific extra-burdens (“Sonderlastenausgleich”), and (3) a
payment to the city centers (“Zentrumslastenausgleich”). The latter is specifically designed
to provide the cities of Zurich and Winterthur, the two biggest cities of canton Zurich, with
sufficient means to supply their inhabitants with infrastructure and other goods and services
that are to a large extent also used by inhabitants of the surrounding municipalities. Payments
in this branch amount to 43% and thereby correspond quite precisely to the amount paid by
the canton (41.3%). As I discuss below, in the baseline calibration to the metroplitan area of
Zurich, I exclude the city of Zurich. Therefore, I do not consider this instrument of the FES.
The second instrument redistributes money to municipalities with a high share of pupils, as
well as to municipalities that face disadvantages in terms of geography or other burdens which
the municipality cannot influence and which the canton authorizes. The economic importance
of this instrument, however, is limited, as it accounts for only 3% of total expenditures. This
is why I also ignore this instrument in my baseline calibration.
Instead, I focus on the first instrument, the transfers based on the resource disparities of the
municipalities. This instrument collects all the payments of rich municipalities into the scheme,
and the paid-out subsidies in this branch of the FES approximately amount to the remaining
half of the budget. The basic structure of this instrument is described in equation (9). The
values of `, υ and τ are the result of a political process and were set to 0.95, 1.1, and 0.7,
respectively, when the new FES was introduced in 2012. For the interpretation of these levels,
recall the concept of a municipality’s fiscal capacity. As laid out in (8), it is equal to the per-
capita tax revenue if the tax rate multiplier is 1 and therefore corresponds to the per-capita
11For more information on the FES (in German), see “Handbuch Zu¨rcher Finanzausgleich”, avail-
able at http://www.finanzausgleich.zh.ch/internet/microsites/finanzausgleich/de/grundlagen/
unterlagen.html, last accessed June 2017. The data presented here for the FES is publicly available
at http://www.statistik.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/statistik/de/daten/daten_oeffentliche_
finanzen/finanzausgleich.html, last accessed June 2017 (look for “Finanzausgleich ab 2012”, which contains
the 2015 data used in this paper).
12Total expenditure of the municipalities in the canton of Zurich amounted to 11,994 million CHF in 2014.
See “Finanzstatistik” of the federal financial administration, available at https://www.efv.admin.ch/efv/
de/home/themen/finanzstatistik/berichterstattung.html, last accessed June 2017.
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cantonal tax liability in that municipality. The average (per-capita) cantonal tax liability over
all municipalities is labeled the average fiscal capacity.
If a municipality’s fiscal capacity is below ` = 95% of the average, it receives the difference
between its actual fiscal capacity and this lower bound as a subsidy. As a consequence, after
the transfer payments, every municipality is (when it selects a multiplier of at least 1) eligible
to spend at least 95% of the average fiscal capacity, which makes ` an effective lower bound
of the revenue capacity of the municipalities. A municipality whose fiscal capacity is more
than 10% higher than the canton’s average, has to pay 70% of its fiscal capacity in excess of
this level. Therefore, τ constitutes a 70% marginal tax on a rich municipality’s fiscal wealth.
In 2014, 127 of the municipalities received payments, 27 paid, and the remaining 13 received
nothing and paid nothing.
3.2 Baseline calibration
I follow Schmidheiny (2006b) and select a set of 39 municipalities around the city of Zurich,
whose inhabitants predominantly work in Zurich’s city center. I leave out the city center as
this ‘municipality’ entails many special factors and characteristics that are not captured in
the present setup. This concerns, e.g., its special role within the FES or the fact that city
centers provide goods and services that are to a larger degree consumed by households residing
elsewhere. Descriptive statistics for the metropolitan area around the city of Zurich are given
in Section C.1 in the Appendix.
The municipalities are sorted according to their per-capita income and divided in two sub-
groups of equal building areas, such that one group contains the rich and the other the poor
municipalities. On the aggregated level, the characteristics of the poor and rich municipalities
are summarized in Table 2. The average income of the households in the group of rich mu-
nicipalities is 80% higher than the average income of the households in the poor group. The
average land price in the rich subgroup is almost 60% higher, although it is inhabited by 40%
fewer households than the poor group, and even though their building areas are equal. The
tax rate multiplier is about one quarter lower in the (group of) rich municipalities, while public
expenditure levels are comparable.
The average amount paid to the fiscal equalization scheme (FES) by rich municipalities was
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the groups of municipalities around the city center of Zurich.
Municipality group
Rich Poor Units Rich/Poor Rich + Poor
Housing
Building area 2,471 2,508 ha 0.99 4,979
Land price (median) 1,540 977 CHF/sqm 1.58
Population
Inhabitants 136,707 224,911 0.61 361,618
Tax payers 91,287 156,660 0.58 247,947
Households 60,490 99,373 0.61 158,863
Average income 109,627 60,038 CHF/Nj 1.83 28.49 bn
1
Tax rate multiplier 82.8 107.6 in % 0.77
Expenditure
Total 3,860 3,628 CHF/Nj 1.06
· · · generating spillovers 1,098 812 CHF/Nj 1.35
· · · high rivalry 2,653 2,715 CHF/Nj 0.98
FES -2,580 426 CHF/Nj -6.06
1 Aggregate income in CHF.
almost 2,600 CHF per capita in 2015, whereas the poor municipalities received approximately
400 CHF.13
The choice of the input parameters for the baseline calibration is summarized in Table A2
and discussed in Section C.2 in the Appendix. Using the data from Table 2 on the two groups
of municipalities, I have to solve a system of 6 equations and 6 unknowns as indicated in
Section 2.3.
Equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are presented in Table 3. Section D.2 in the
Appendix offers a sensitivity analysis, for which I varied some of the parameters that are less
easily observed. Figure 1 reveals the distribution of households as well as the loci of median
voters in the y-α-space for the baseline calibration. The solid line is the locus of indifferent
households. All households with a value of α below this curve reside in municipality 1, those
above this curve reside in municipality 2. Therefore, the inhabitants of municipality 1 have
lower levels of α, i.e., wish to spend less on the publicly provided good (for a given level of
income) than the households in municipality 2. The distributions of y and α are independent,
such that, if the locus of indifferent households was a horizontal line, both municipalities
13Note that the simple addition of payments to or from the FES for each subgroup member (i.e., the munici-
palities at the disaggregated level) does not equate to the total amount calculated for the subgroup as a whole.
The reason is that according to the scheme, payments are determined at the aggregated level rather than at the
individual level; this means that averages calculated for some intermediate level of aggregation (municipalities)
will not generally equal the averages calculated for higher levels of aggregation (such as municipality groups).
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Table 3: Model outcome: Baseline calibration.
Municipality group Rich/Poor1
Symbol Rich Poor Units Cal. Data
Index number j 1 2
Household distribution
Population Nj 142.934 217.066 k 0.66 0.61
Average income Yj/Nj 97.902 60.980 k CHF 1.61 1.83
Municipality characteristics
Housing price pj 13.330 13.352 k CHF/10sqm 1.00 1.58
Tax rate multiplier tj 82.803 113.734 % 0.73 0.77
Public consumption gj 12.606 17.407 k CHF/Nj 0.72 –
Public expenditure Gj/Nj 3.059 4.573 k CHF/Nj 0.67 1.06
FES FESj -1.787 1.456 k CHF/Nj -1.23 -6.06
1 “Cal.” refers to the baseline calibration presented here and “Data” are observed values from Table 2.
would have exactly the same average income. Segregation would in that case be limited to the
preference for the publicly provided good. For my baseline calibration, more poor households
reside in municipality 2, the home of the ‘public good lovers’. This implies that the households
residing in municipality 1 are richer (on average) than those residing in municipality 2.
Overall, the model is capable of generating a realistic distribution of households: The 143k
(from a total of 360k) households that reside in the rich municipality (where the label ‘rich’ and
‘poor’ is endogenous) have an average annual income of 98k CHF, whereas the remaining 217k
households in the poor municipality make on average 61k CHF per annum. This implies that
for my baseline calibration, the rich municipality is slightly overcrowded and slightly poorer
than observed, as approximately 137k households that earn an average annual income of 110k
CHF actually reside in the rich group of municipalities.
My baseline calibration also predicts the observed tax rate multipliers quite well. I adjusted
the subsistence level of the publicly provided good, βg, such that the predicted tax rate mul-
tiplier in the rich municipality matches the observed 82.8% of the cantonal tax liability. The
corresponding multiplier in the poor municipality is predicted 6 percentage points above the
observed 107.6%. This divergence can at least partly be explained by the imprecise fit of the
household distribution.
Concerning the remaining outcome variables, the fit of my baseline calibration is less ac-
curate. The relative size of the payments to or from the FES, the (relative) level of public
expenditures, and the relative housing prices in both municipalities require further inquiry into
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Figure 1: Locus of indifferent households and loci of median voters in the y-α-space.
the sources of the divergences. First, consider the FES. Recall its mechanics from (9) and note
that the amount any municipality j has to pay or may receive depends on FCj = TBj/Nj,
its average tax base. With a progressive cantonal tax scheme, the aggregate tax base in that
municipality, TBj, is not equal to the cantonal tax liability of the mean household income
times the population: TBj 6= b(yˆj)Nj, where yˆj = Yj/Nj is the average income. Rather it
depends on the population composition of this specific municipality, whether this amount is
larger or smaller. With many rich households in a municipality, TBj > b(yˆj)Nj; and with many
poor households, the opposite holds. This directly relates to the concept of fiscal capacity: For
municipalities with relatively many rich [poor] households, FCj > [ < ]b(yˆj). This is relevant,
since – following the same logic – the ‘average’ amount that is credited to the FES for a group
of rich municipalities and the ‘average’ amount that is debited from the FES for a group of
poor municipalities are not equal to what one rich and one poor municipality would pay or
receive. Intuitively, the amount that the rich group had to pay would be lower and the amount
the poor group would receive would be higher than the respective (population-weighted) sum
of the actual payments from or to the single municipalities in each subgroup. This is what I
observe here: Payments of the rich group amount to 1,800 CHF in my calibration (vs. 2,580 in
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Table 2), and the subsidies to the poor group are 1,500 CHF (vs. 400). Note that a mediating
factor is that the average fiscal capacity is set below its ‘true’ value, as discussed in Section C.2
in the Appendix.
This leaves the discussion of the housing prices and of the public consumption levels, where
the calibration does not fit the reality well. In my calibration, housing prices are equal in
both municipalities, whereas the observed average building areas price is almost 60% higher in
the rich municipality group. While public spending levels in both municipalities are roughly
equal according to the data, in my calibrated version, the rich spend one third less than
the poor on the publicly provided good. These mispredictions might have a common source:
Rather than splitting the population into a segment of rich households (averaged) who love
to spend money on housing and another segment of poor households (averaged) who do not,
I split the population into public good lovers and public good haters. Note that the poorer
households reside to a larger extent with the public good lovers. This is intuitive in the
presence of progressive taxation, since they are obliged to contribute underproportionally to
public revenue and therefore care less about the level of tj. With a linear tax scheme, no FES,
and no α-heterogeneity, I show in Table A4 in the Appendix that this model is capable of
predicting housing prices that are accurate to relative scale. It can be seen as an extension
of the case with only income heterogeneity discussed in Schmidheiny (2006b, columns 2 and 3
in Table 1), where I additionally allow for spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of
the publicly provided good. An approach to overcome this imprecise prediction of the relative
housing prices could be to add taste heterogeneity with respect to the housing preference, γ.
Since this model is able to explain the other features of the metropolitan area around the city
of Zurich quite well, however, I stick with a fixed γ for the scope of this paper.14
4 Policy evaluation
In this section, I discuss two sets of policy changes: First, I gradually remove the fiscal equal-
ization scheme (FES); then I change the underlying tax scheme – to a more progressive one
and to a linear one.
14That adding γ-heterogeneity might help the model is supported by Schmidheiny (2006b), who modeled taste
heterogeneity with respect to the housing preference parameter. His calibrated equilibrium is characterized by
higher housing prices and higher public production levels in the rich municipality.
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4.1 Removal of the FES
The FES redistributes a significant amount of money from richer to poorer municipalities. All
else held constant, it is easily possible to quantify its importance, e.g., in terms of counter-
factual tax rate multipliers necessary to maintain consumption levels if the FES did not exist.
Such ceteris paribus analyses, however, are incomplete, as they ignore the general equilib-
rium effects. These reveal the FES’ mitigating effect on segregation, taking into account the
adjustments in the housing prices, tax rates, and public expenditure.
To show these adjustments, I gradually remove the FES from the baseline calibration used
in the previous section. To do so, I introduce the weighting parameter κ ∈ [0, 1] and assume
that the payment from or to the FES is given by κ · FESj, where FESj is determined by (9).
Starting from the baseline calibration (κ = 1), this amount is gradually reduced to 0, for which
no payments are enforced and therefore the FES is effectively switched off. Thus, the general
setup of the FES and therefore the incentive structure remain unchanged, but are increasingly
weak. For values of κ below 40%, I found equilibria in which one municipality is ‘empty’,
i.e., left without households. This can be interpreted as the most extreme form of the ‘poor
chasing the rich’. This rather peculiar outcome seems unlikely, which is why I left out these
cases in parts of the analysis. It illustrates, however, the important function that the FES has
in achieving a socially more desirable, i.e., less segregated distribution of households in the
presence of local tax competition.
Table 4 summarizes the municipality characteristics when the FES is gradually reduced,
and Figure 2 visualizes the relative strength of these changes. The levels of public consumption
g, public expenditure G/N , and of the housing price p do not change much. And if they do, it
is in the expected way: Public consumption and expenditure is higher in the rich and lower in
the poor municipality for lower values of κ.
The tax rate multiplier t heavily decreases in both the rich and the poor municipality as κ
decreases. The decrease of the tax rate of the poor municipality is, at first glance, surprising,
since the FES effectively subsidizes the poor municipality. If subsidies are faded out, this
municipality becomes less attractive – even more so in comparison to the rich one that becomes
more attractive as it has to pay less. This is why one could expect the public expenditure levels
in the poor municipality to decrease, and/or the tax rate multiplier to increase and housing
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Table 4: Phasing-out the FES: Effect on municipality characteristics.
FES effect1
κ 100% 80% 60% 40% 0%2
Housing price p
13 13.331 13.357 13.388 13.430 19.707
2 13.352 13.369 13.384 13.396 0.001
Tax rate multiplier t
1 0.828 0.766 0.699 0.624 0.935
2 1.137 1.079 1.019 0.948 1.032
Public consumption g
1 12.606 12.606 12.603 12.621 16.192
2 17.407 17.291 17.092 16.673 10.828
Public expenditure G/N
1 3.059 3.074 3.100 3.167 3.717
2 4.573 4.528 4.452 4.295 0.001
Population N
1 142.934 141.247 138.418 132.699 360.000
2 217.066 218.753 221.582 227.301 0.000
Average income Y/N
1 97.902 99.242 101.583 106.669 75.639
2 60.980 60.400 59.433 57.524 NaN
FES payment FES
1 -1.787 -1.487 -1.190 -0.903 0.000
2 1.456 1.614 1.773 1.936 0.000
1 “FES effect” (κ) describes to what percentage the fiscal equalization scheme is implemented, relative to the
full implementation described in (9) and used in the baseline. Consequently, the 100% column is the baseline
calibration. The 0% column describes the equilibrium without the FES, and the columns in between show what
payments would occur if the payment of each municipality group would only be 80, 60, or 40% of the amount
that would, respectively, follow from (9).
2 For values below 40%, I was only able to detect equilibria in which all households gather in one municipality,
whereas the other is left empty. Such an equilibrium is presented for the case without the FES (0% column).
3 “1” and “2” label the municipalities. Municipality 1 is defined as the municipality that inhabits the households
with the low preferences for the publicly provided good (α) and municipality 2 the households with high levels
of α. Throughout, municipality 1 turns out to have a higher average income, which is why I label it the ‘rich’
municipality.
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Figure 2: Phasing-out the FES: Relative change of municipality characteristics.
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Figure 3: Phasing-out the FES: Effects on the distribution of households in the y-α-space.
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prices to fall. But this kind of reasoning neglects the general equilibrium effects: What happens
in addition, is that the households allocate differently.
The household distribution for decreasing κ is displayed in Figure 3, which illustrates how
the locus of indifferent voters changes. When phasing out the FES, more poor households reside
in the poor municipality, and more rich households reside in the rich municipality. Table 4
shows how this translates to changes in the population and mean income, and therefore reveals
the scope of this change in the distribution of households: For κ = 0.4, the rich municipality
has 7% fewer inhabitants and its average income is approximately 8% higher compared to the
full implementation of the FES. This is support for the intuitive claim that the FES mitigates
segregation induced by income tax competition at the local level.
Moreover, for smaller levels of κ, the poor municipality offers higher public consumption
levels than the rich municipality at the expense of higher tax rates. Keep in mind that in the
presence of progressive taxes poor households are hurt less by the higher tax rate multiplier
than the rich, which explains why more poor households reside in the poor municipality.
The change in the distribution of households explains an unexpected pattern: The amount
that the poor municipality receives through the FES is higher for smaller levels of κ than
in the baseline case. The contribution of (very) poor households to the fiscal capacity of a
municipality is (very) small, such that – when the FES is faded out – the ‘migration’ of poor
households into the already poor municipality causes the average fiscal capacity to decrease.
This decrease is so pronounced, that κ · FES is actually increasing as κ decreases. Note from
Table 4 that the tax rate multipliers in both municipalities are below baseline levels for small
values of κ; and Figure 2 reveals that the decrease of the multiplier is more pronounced in the
rich municipality. This is why not only fewer poor households but also more rich households
reside in the rich municipality when κ is small compared to the baseline.
Payments from the rich municipality to the FES, however, are lower for lower values of κ.
This indicates that the fiscal capacity of the rich municipality does not increase ‘too strongly’
and thereby overcompensate the decreased payment due to lower levels of κ.
For even lower levels of κ, i.e., if κ < 0.4, the payments to the poor municipality start
decreasing (not displayed). One could say that all poor households which caused the over-
proportional decrease in the fiscal capacity (which in turn led to increasing transfer payments,
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although the scheme was faded out), are already living in the poor municipality. This implies
that the poor municipality can no longer attract additional households; instead, a rather pecu-
liar form of segregation, that leaves one municipality empty, occurs. Though I do not consider
this household distribution to be a realistic description of what would happen if the canton of
Zurich removed its FES, the results support the claim that the existence of the FES is a crucial
measure to counter the segregating forces created by local tax competition – especially in the
presence of an underlying progressive tax scheme.
To sum up, public consumption and public expenditure are surprisingly stable as the FES is
faded out, even though the poor municipality has to cope with a modest decrease of both. For
smaller levels of κ, the households allocate differently. This consequence at first dominates the
direct effect of the phase-out on the subsidy that the poor municipality receives through the
FES. This causes the higher level of subsidies for smaller levels of κ. Since the payments from
the rich municipality to the FES are decreasing as the FES is faded out, lower levels of κ allow
both municipalities to set a lower tax rate multiplier whilst still providing relatively high levels
of public expenditure and consumption. Concerning the ability to mitigate segregation, the
existence of the fully implemented FES (as in the baseline calibration) proved quite powerful.
4.2 Change of the underlying tax code
In this section, I investigate the role of the progressivity of the tax scheme, leaving the FES
fully implemented as in the baseline calibration. I analyze two policy changes, illustrated in
Figure 4 which plots the tax liabilities of the three tax schemes for different levels of income
and where the tax rate multiplier is 1 (for tax liabilities of income levels beyond 300k CHF see
Table A5 in the Appendix).
First, I change the tax code to a linear tax scheme, for which I set the tax rate equal to
the average tax rate of all households residing in my municipalities. In mathematical terms,
the marginal rate of the linear tax scheme is set to
∑
j TBj/
∑
j Yj. This ensures that tax rate
multipliers of this policy scenario are comparable to the baseline scenario in the sense that
the fiscal capacity is equal. Poorer households up to a taxable income of around 100k CHF
face higher tax bills under the linear scheme compared to the progressive ones, while richer
households pay less if taxed with the linear scheme.
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Figure 4: Changing the progressive tax scheme: Tax liability per income.
The second is an increase in the progression of the cantonal tax code. The average fiscal
capacity under this code is about 10% higher than in the baseline case, which has two implica-
tions: First, the absolute levels of the tax rate multipliers are not perfectly comparable to the
baseline, since (on average) the same multiplier translates to 10% more revenue; and, second,
since FCavg has not been increased, the poor municipality receives less and the rich pays more
than they would if FCavg were adjusted and therefore the equilibrium payments from [to] the
scheme are too low [too high].
Table 5 summarizes the equilibrium values of municipality characteristics for the three
tax schemes and Figure 5 plots the loci of indifferent households and of the median voters.
Increasing the progression of the tax code increases the degree of segregation of rich and poor
households and thus leads to more redistribution through the FES. In total numbers, the
household distribution is not changing much; but the magnitude of the FES-payments is: The
rich municipality has to pay roughly 1,000 CHF more per capita, and the poor receives an
additional amount in excess of 500 CHF per capita, which is partly because the FESavg value
was not increased.
Next, consider the switch to a linear tax scheme, where households pay a flat rate of
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Table 5: Changing the progressive tax scheme: Effect on municipality characteristics.
Tax scheme
Baseline More progressive Linear
Housing price p
11 13.331 13.293 13.361
2 13.352 13.348 13.277
Tax rate multiplier t
1 0.828 0.816 0.818
2 1.137 1.075 1.213
Public consumption g
1 12.606 13.094 11.672
2 17.407 18.576 16.047
Public expenditure G/N
1 3.059 3.141 2.724
2 4.573 4.874 4.655
Population N
1 142.934 139.534 200.272
2 217.066 220.466 159.728
Average income Y/N
1 97.902 100.861 66.559
2 60.980 59.677 87.025
FES payment FES
1 -1.787 -2.702 -0.139
2 1.456 1.969 -0.893
1 “1” and “2” label the municipalities. Municipality 1 is defined as the municipality that inhabits the households
with the low preferences for the publicly provided good (α) and municipality 2 the households with high levels
of α. Instead of using the municipality number, I often label the two municipalities ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ instead,
according to their respective average income.
5.26% of their income. The pattern of the household distribution changes as expected: The
degree of segregation is lower, and the households are distributed more evenly among both
municipalities. The municipality characteristics (p, t, g) remain relatively unchanged, except
for slightly lower public provision levels in both municipalities. This can be explained by the
fact that now both municipalities have to pay to the FES. This is not implausible, for two
reasons: (1) The selected municipalities are richer than the canton-wide average, and thereby
are on average net-payers to the municipal FES in the canton of Zurich. (2) I set the average
fiscal capacity below its ‘true’ value, as discussed on page 41 in Section C.2 in the Appendix. If
households are distributed equally enough this can cause the (somewhat odd) situation where
all municipalities pay contributions to the FES.
Recall that by definition, conditional on the level of income y, municipality 1 is containing
the households with the low values of α, and municipality 2 those with high levels. Figure 5
reveals that in the cases of a progressive tax scheme, the poorer households congregate to
a larger extent in municipality 2 (‘public good lovers’); in the case of a linear tax scheme,
however, the poorer households prefer, on average, to live in municipality 1 (where the ‘public
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Figure 5: Changing the progressive tax scheme: Effect on the distribution of households (solid
lines) and on the loci of indifferent households (dashed lines).
good haters’ reside). This causes the attribution of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ to swap: With linear taxes,
municipality 2 is inhabited by (on average) richer households and municipality 1 by the poorer
ones. The intuition is that linear taxes increase the tax burden of the poor households which
consequently makes them more sensitive to the tax rate multiplier in their municipality: The
incentive to ‘sneak’ into the municipality, where the rich pay an over-proportional share of the
higher tax levels, decreases.
The results from this section indicate that a progressive tax scheme entails strong segregat-
ing forces in terms of an increasing disparity of average income levels and in terms of a more
uneven distribution of households: When compared to the revenue-neutral linear tax rates, I
find that the group of rich municipalities is inhabited by 11% fewer households and is 12%
richer if the progressive scheme from the baseline calibration is being implemented.
5 Conclusion
I presented a model of local tax competition that combines a progressive income tax scheme
and a fiscal equalization scheme (FES). Households that differ with respect to income and
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their preference for a publicly provided good choose to locate in one of two municipalities.
This locational choice, in turn, determines the triplet of housing prices, tax rate multipliers,
and public consumption levels, where the multipliers are determined by majority voting. The
trade-off between these characteristics determine for each household which municipality is its
preferred choice of residence.
With this model, I can predict the migrational consequences of changes in the FES or the
tax system. For a given household distribution, a progressive income tax scheme is preferable
to a linear tax scheme in terms of equity. If households choose their location freely, the equity
implications of a progressive tax scheme are less clear: Roller & Schmidheiny (2016) show that
household mobility weakens the degree of progression in the effective average and marginal
tax rates (measured as the observed actual tax payments of households) and can even imply
lower average tax rates for higher-income households, i.e., a regressive actual taxation. Their
work, however is purely descriptive in the sense that the focus is on the interaction between the
locational choice of heterogeneous households and their effective tax liabilities. By changing
the underlying tax scheme of my baseline calibration, I was able to show that an increase
in the degree of progression leads to a stronger segregation of rich and poor households: In
the baseline calibration, i.e., with progressive taxes, the average income in the ‘rich’ group of
municipalities is 60% higher than in the ‘poor’. With linear taxes my model predicts that
this ratio drops significantly with the consequences that the rich would only be 30% richer on
average.
One reason why such a system of local revenue generation can prevail, is fiscal equalization,
typically enforced by a higher level of government. I have modeled the FES implemented in
the canton of Zurich (Switzerland). It redistributes money from richer municipalities to poorer
ones and therefore mitigates the degree of segregation as it provides incentives for the rich
households to reside in the poor municipalities. My model predicts that if the FES was only
implemented at 40% of its original strength, the rich municipalities would gain almost a 10%
increase in average income, while the number of households residing there would fall by 8%.
The FES therefore actually carries out the function of limiting the degree of segregation.
The approach chosen here for analyzing the consequences and the interplay of progressive
taxation and fiscal equalization, of course, has some important limitations. It is inherently
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space- and timeless, where the latter implies that I cannot deduce the transition path to a
new equilibrium after policy changes. To ignore spatial characteristics entails a loss of detail,
because economic costs (such as longer commuting times due to increased travel distances to
the city center) are ignored. Obvious extensions include to allow for heterogeneity with respect
to the housing preference rate; or to endogenize the labor-leisure choice of the households. The
latter would allow households to adjust their workload depending on the tax burden. Another
interesting extension would be to include the city center in the model. This adaptation to
the model would necessitate a consideration of asymmetric inter-jurisdictional spillovers and
congestion parameters as well as the extra payments for the city center according to the FES.
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A Functional forms and equilibrium conditions
A.1 Stone-Geary utility and housing supply
As in much of the previous literature on local income tax competition, the preference structure
of households is supposed to be characterized by a Stone-Geary utility function (see Schmid-
heiny 2002, 2006b, Kuhlmey & Hintermann 2016). More precisely, the utility of a household
with preference α for the publicly provided good is given by
Uj(x
j, hj, gj;α) = α ln(gj − βg) (A1)
+ (1− α) [γ ln(hj − βh) + (1− γ) ln(xj − βx)] ,
where βg, βh and βx are subsistence levels for gj, h
j and xj, respectively. Beyond this subsistence
consumption, (A1) supports a linear expenditure system: α ∈ [0, 1] determines what share of
the remaining income (after having paid for the subsistence levels) a household wants to spend
for the publicly provided good. The remainder of that amount is then spent on the private
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consumption bundle: A share of γ ∈ [0, 1] is spent on housing and a share of (1 − γ) on the
numeraire.
The indirect utility function (1) follows as
V (pj, tj, gj; y, α) = α ln(gj − βg) (A2)
+ (1− α)
[
ln
(
ydispj (y)
)
− γ ln(pj) + c
]
,
where c ≡ γ ln (γ) + (1 − γ) ln(1 − γ) is constant and ydispj ≡ y − tj · b(y) − pjβh − βx is
the net income after paying taxes and providing the subsistence consumption levels of the
private consumption bundle and is therefore a measure of disposable income. The remaining
expressions can be derived from the indirect utility function (A2). These include the aggregate
housing demand HDj, the locus of indifferent households α˜j−1,j(y) or the locus of median
voters αmj (y). They are derived in the next section.
Concerning aggregate housing supply, I follow the previous literature and assume
HSj(pj) = Ljp
θ
j , (A3)
where Lj is the available land in j and θ the price elasticity of the housing supply.
A.2 Equilibrium conditions of the model
The set of 3J ‘true’ equations that define the model are, for every j, the housing market clearing
condition (2), the median voting condition (5), and the equation to determine the consumption
level of the publicly provided good (6).
First, I derive the housing market clearing condition. For the Stone-Geary utility function
(A1), the housing demand of household (y, α) in j is given by
hj(y, α) = γydispj (y)/pj + βh. (A4)
Note that it is independent of α, which reflects the fact that the households cannot freely choose
their preferred level of public provision, but have to consume the uniform consumption level,
which is determined by (and therefore only optimal for) the households at the locus of median
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voters. Aggregate housing demand follows as the double integral of (A4) for all households
residing in j as N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
hj(y, α)f(y)f(α)dαdy. Considering the aggregate housing supply
from (A3), the housing market clearing condition in j therefore reads as
Ljp
θ
j − γ/pj [Yj − tjTBj −Nj(pjβh + βx)]−Njβh = 0, (A5)
where Nj ≡ N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
f(y)f(α)dαdy, Yj ≡ N
∫ yj
yj
∫ αj(y)
αj(y)
yf(y)f(α)dαdy, and TBj is given
by (7).
The locus of indifferent households between the two municipalities is given by the lower
bound, αj(y), and the upper bound, αj(y). Assume (without loss of generality) that the
municipalities are numbered in ascending order, such that municipality j − 1 contains the
households with lower levels of α for any given level of y, and municipality j+1, the households
with higher levels of alpha. Then, the locus of indifferent households between any two adjacent
municipalities, say j and j + 1, follows from V j+1(y, α) − V j(y, α) = 0. For our functional
forms, this can be solved for
α
1− α =
− ln
(
ydispj+1
ydispj
)
+ γ ln
(
pj+1
pj
)
ln
(
gj+1−βg
gj−βg
) ≡ nomj
denomj
, (A6)
which gives the locus α˜j,j+1(y) =
nomj
nomj+denomj
as a function of the municipality characteristics
(pj, gj, tj) and (pj+1, gj+1, tj+1). This defines the two integral borders αj(y) = αj+1(y) =
α˜j,j+1(y). Note that I could also solve for the locus of indifferent households in terms of income,
y. This would imply solving for y˜j,j+1(α) and require that I change the order of integration (α
as the outer and y as the inner integral). The results would be identical. I chose to solve for
α-loci, since this is simpler for the given functional forms.
I now turn to the median voting condition (5). This requires that we find the locus of
median voters, αmj (y), that cuts, for any j, the population in half. Recall that the households
to the one side of this locus preferred higher tax rates, and those to the other side of the locus,
lower tax rates. Again, the locus of the median voters in j can be expressed in terms of the
municipality characteristics. As mentioned on page 6, the preferred tax rate of household (y, α)
follows from maximizing V j(y, α) with respect to tj and subject to (6). The corresponding first
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order expression can be solved to
α
1− α =
b(y) (gj − βg)
(
Nj + ν
∑
i 6=j Ni
)ρ
ydispj TBj
≡ nom
m
j
denommj
, (A7)
which – as above – gives the locus αmj (y) =
nommj
nommj +denom
m
j
. The tax rate in every j is then deter-
mined such that the thus defined locus of median voters exactly splits the population in half,
as formulated in (5). Note that the last set of the equilibrium conditions, (6), that determine
gj, has been used here. It depends on Gj, which is given according to (10), which depends on
FESj according to (9). This, in turn, is determined by the distribution of households, which
is implicitly defined by A6. The point I want to make here, is that the model, though rather
complex, can be boiled down to search for 3J values of municipality characteristics such that
the equations (A5), (5), and (6) are satisfied.
B Conditions for Income Segregation
In the context of linear income tax competition, Schmidheiny (2002) has established a set of
two conditions that are sufficient to establish the segregation of the households according to
income and taste.15 In this appendix, I show to what extent the sufficient condition, which is
violated in the presence of a progressive tax base b(y), can be relaxed, such that it becomes a
necessary condition for segregation.
B.1 Schmidheiny’s sufficient conditions for segregation
The restrictions concern the households’ trade-off between the municipality characteristics
(pj, tj, gj). A set of two conditions is required for each dimension in which households are
heterogeneous:16
Single-crossing condition The marginal rate of substitution between any two of the char-
acteristics of the municipality (pj, tj, gj) changes monotonically in y and α. This causes
the respective indifferent curves of two households that differ in y or α to cross only once.
15Note that these are only sufficient if an equilibrium exists, but not sufficient to establish that it does exist.
16Schmidheiny actually defines a set of three conditions. The combination of his first two conditions yields
the first condition, which is the single-crossing condition.
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Proportional shift in relative preferences The change in these relative preferences needs
to be proportional to (or independent from) the level of y and α. For a formal definition
of this condition, see Schmidheiny (2002).
With taste and income heterogeneity, this requires that four conditions are met. The two
conditions concerning taste heterogeneity are not affected by introducing either progressive
taxes or a FES, and remain therefore unchanged.
B.2 Single-crossing (monotonicity of preferences)
With regard to the other source of heterogeneity, income y, additional restrictions are necessary
for the single-crossing condition to hold in my model. They involve the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between any two of the three municipality characteristics. I denote as
Mm,n the MRS between m ∈ (pj, gj, tj) and n ∈ (pj, gj, tj), where m 6= n and the third
municipality characteristic, o, is assumed to be constant. This implies that the MRS can be
determined from the indirect utility function using the implicit function theorem:
Mm,n(y, α) ≡ dm
dn
∣∣∣∣∣
dV j(y,α)=do=0
= − ∂V
j(y, α)/∂n
∂V j(y, α)/∂m
, (A8)
where I introduced V j(y, α) ≡ V (pj, tj, gj; y, α) as shorthand-notation for the indirect utility
function (A2). For the specification at hand, the relevant marginal rates of substitution are
given by
Mgj ,pj(y, α) =
1− α
α
(gj − βg)
(
βh/y
disp
j (y) + γ/pj
)
, (A9)
Mtj ,gj(y, α) =
α
1− α
ydispj (y)/b(y)
gj − βg , (A10)
Mtj ,pj(y, α) =−
βh + γy
disp
j (y)/pj
b(y)
. (A11)
The single-crossing condition is satisfied if each MRS changes monotonically in y, i.e., if the
sign of ∂Mm,n(·)
∂y
is the same for all y. This requires additional restrictions on the progression of
34
the tax base b(y). To identify them, first consider the partial derivatives of (A9)–(A11):
∂Mgj ,pj(y, α)
∂y
=− βh1− α
α
(gj − βg)(
ydispj (y)
)2 [1− tjbm(y)] , (A12)
∂Mtj ,gj(y, α)
∂y
=
α
1− α
y − pjβh − βx
y · b(y) · (gj − βg)
[
y
y − pjβh − βx − εb,y
]
, (A13)
∂Mtj ,pj(y, α)
∂y
=
bm(y)
b(y)2
[
βh + γy
disp
j (y)/pj − γy
1− tjbm(y)
εb,y
]
. (A14)
The term bm(y) ≡ ∂b(y)
∂y
denotes the marginal tax base. It corresponds to the marginal cantonal
tax liability in the baseline calibration; and it is positive for linear and progressive tax schemes.
The term εb,y ≡ bm(y) yb(y) is the elasticity of the cantonal tax code with respect to income. For
a progressive scheme it is larger than 1.
The sign of (A12)–(A14) is determined by the respective terms in the square brackets. The
mildest restriction is required for (A12). I assume tjb
m(y) < 1. This assumption means that the
marginal tax rate does not exceed 100% for any level of income. Therefore, if βh > 0, it holds
that
∂Mgj ,pj (y,α)
∂y
< 0 ∀ y, which can be interpreted as follows: Mgj ,pj(y, α) is positive for all y and
α, which means that all households accept a higher level of public provision as compensation
for a higher housing price.
∂Mgj ,pj (y,α)
∂y
< 0 then reveals that richer households require a smaller
increase in the level of public consumption than poor households. For the case that βh = 0, the
trade-off between gj and pj does not change in income, such that
∂Mgj ,pj (y,α)
∂y
= 0. Note that
in this case the second of the sufficient conditions would hold – irrespective of the tax scheme
b(y) (see Schmidheiny 2002, p. 6).
A less clear-cut assumption is required to establish the monotonicity of (A13):
∂Mtj ,gj(y, α)
∂y

< 0 if εb,y >
y
y−pjβh−βx (≥ 1)
> 0 if y
y−pjβh−βx > εb,y (≥ 1) .
(A15)
The MRS between the tax rate multiplier and the publicly provided good therefore complies
with the necessary assumption of monotonicity, if for every level of income either always the
one or the other case holds. The MRS is decreasing in income (case 1), if the elasticity of the
cantonal tax liability is larger than the share of gross income relative to the available income
after having paid for the private subsistence levels. This is the case when the progression is not
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too low, and the subsistence levels not too high.17 On the other hand, the MRS is increasing
in income (case 2) if subsistence levels are sufficiently high and progression sufficiently low.
The interpretation is as follows: Mtj ,gj(y, α) is positive for all combinations of income
and taste, which translates to households accepting higher tax rates if they can also consume
higher levels of the publicly provided good.
∂Mtj ,gj (y,α)
∂y
< 0 then describes the case where rich
households accept a lower increase in tj in exchange of a marginal rise in gj. With case 2, the
rich accept a higher increase in tj than the poor.
Lastly, I turn to the MRS between the tax rate and the housing price, which is negative
for all y and α. This means that a household demands a decrease in the housing price as
compensation for an increase of the tax rate. This trade-off changes in income according
to (A14):
∂Mtj ,pj(y, α)
∂y

< 0 if βh + γy
disp
j (y)/pj − γy 1−tjb
m(y)
εb,y
< 0
> 0 if βh + γy
disp
j (y)/pj − γy 1−tjb
m(y)
εb,y
> 0.
(A16)
To ensure monotonicity, the inequality in (A16) must have the same sign for all values of y and
α. Whether it is positive or negative depends then on the full specification of the model and
the equilibrium characteristics of the municipalities. For now, it is sufficient that an expression
to determine the sign can be identified.
To sum up, under some additional assumptions, the first of Schmidheiny’s two sufficient
conditions can be adopted to progressive taxation.
B.3 The proportional shift in relative preferences
The second of Schmidheiny’s conditions, the proportional shift in relative preferences, is (for
the functional forms used in this paper) only satisfied if βh = 0, see (A12). For positive levels
of the subsistence level for housing, it is not satisfied in the presence of a progressive tax
scheme. This general incompatibility has already been mentioned in Schmidheiny (2002). In
this section, I want to discuss the necessary restrictions on preferences to comply with income
17I assume that the subsistence levels are feasible for every household, which means that yy−pjβh−βx ≥ 1,
where this holds with equality if and only if there are no subsistence levels. Therefore, the two conditions that
βh = βx = 0 and b(y) is a progressive tax scheme, would be sufficient to establish the monotonicity of the
tj-gj-trade-off.
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segregation if βh > 0.
Figure A1 illustrates my argument. The figure consists of three panels, each depicting
indifference curves in the g-t-space. These are from three households that differ with respect
to their income (yI < yII < yIII) but have the same α. Let the housing price, which is not
depicted, be either p1 or p2, with p1 6= p2. Assume that there are two municipalities, 1 and 2,
characterized by the triplets (p1, t1, g1) and (p2, t2, g2), respectively. Denote the level of utility
that each of the three households realizes when residing in municipality 1 by V
yI
p1
, V
yII
p1
, and
V
yIII
p1
, respectively. This allows me to plot the first three indifference curves, the dashed lines.
The solid lines show indifference curves that provide each household with the same utility as
it receives in municipality 1, given the housing price from the second municipality, p2. This is,
V
y
p1
= V
y
p2
∀ y ∈ [yI , yII , yIII ]. Assume further that household yII is indifferent between both
municipalities such that V
yII
p2
goes through (g2, t2). For the poorer and richer households, V
yI
p2
and V
yIII
p2
describe the respective combinations of g and t that makes them just indifferent to
municipality 1, if the housing price is p2.
18
Panel 1 corresponds to Schmidheiny’s (2002) Figure 2 and depicts a situation where the
condition of the proportional shift in the relative preferences is met: The indifference curves of
the three households intersect in one point for each housing price. In my illustration, the poor
household prefers to live in municipality 1, while the richer household prefers municipality 2.
Panel 3 depicts a situation where the assumption of a proportional shift is violated, and
income segregation is not incentive-compatible. This corresponds to Figure 3 in Schmidheiny
(2002). However, this is not necessarily the case, whenever the assumption is violated, as shown
in panel 2. The three indifference curves for p2 do not cross in one point; they are shifted
unproportionally. Still, in this situation, income segregation is incentive-compatible: The poor
household prefers municipality 1, the rich prefers municipality 2. Although the assumption of
a proportional shift in relative preferences is clearly violated, income segregation is possible.
If this argument can be extended to any (yI , yII , yIII)-α-combination and for any trade-off
between (pj, tj, gj), any equilibrium will be characterized by income segregation.
18The solid lines for the rich and poor household do not indicate the utility they receive in municipality 2,
i.e., in the point (p2, t2, g2). These would be the indifference curves through (g2, t2) for the housing price equal
to p2. They are not depicted.
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Figure A1: Indifference curves in the g-t-space for different values of p and y.
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C Descriptive Statistics and Specification of the Model
C.1 Selection of municipalities
The set of selected municipalities of the Zurich metropolitan area (without the city itself) is
listed in Table A1. All data are for 2015 or the latest available year and are provided by the
Statistical Office of the Canton of Zurich and publicly available.19
The average taxable income in the richest municipality, Uitikon, amounted to almost
150k CHF in 2015, more than three times the average income in the poorest municipality,
Oberglatt. The price for building areas is correlated with this measure: The median price for
building areas is systematically higher in the rich municipalities when compared to the poor,
even though substantial heterogeneity can be observed within each group (rich: 800 to 2,100
CHF/m2; poor: 600 to 1,200 CHF/m2). The tax rate multiplier varies between 75% in Ru¨sch-
likon and 124% in Dietikon. There, also, appears to be a clear pattern of lower multipliers
in the rich municipalities and higher multipliers in poor municipalities. Total expenditure, on
the other hand, varies greatly within both subgroups: The rich municipalities spend per capita
between 1,700 and 5,000, the poor spend between 1,900 and 4,500 CHF.
By construction, payments to or from the FES are highly correlated with group membership
as well: The rich pay money to the FES, and the poor receive money from the FES. Only three
municipalities in the rich group receive money, and only two in the poor group pay. Six
municipalities have zero payments, of which four are in the poor group. Note that reported
numbers are net payments (or subsidies) and relate to all instruments of the FES. I focus
on the instrument to balance the fiscal capacity – the “Ressourcenausgleich”, which is the
most important instrument in terms of size. For the selected municipalities, only three receive
payments from one of the other instruments of the FES, and these are small.20
19They are listed in the “Gemeindeportra¨t Kanton Zu¨rich” (see http://www.statistik.zh.ch/internet/
justiz_inneres/statistik/de/daten/gemeindeportraet_kanton_zuerich.html, last accessed June 2017),
except for the data on the FES and the data on the building areas (see the “Arealstatistik” published by
the Federal Statistal Office, which is available at https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/
raum-umwelt/bodennutzung-bedeckung/gesamtspektrum-regionalen-stufen/gemeinden.html, last ac-
cessed June 2017).
20Stallikon received 116, Bonstetten 131, and Hedingen 33 CHF per capita in 2015. See
http://www.statistik.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/statistik/de/daten/daten_oeffentliche_
finanzen/finanzausgleich.html, last accessed June 2017 (look for “Finanzausgleich ab 2012”, which
contains the 2015 data used here).
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C.2 Model specification
In the following I present the parameters used for the baseline calibration, which are summa-
rized in Table A2. For a sensitivity analysis that tests the sensitivity of the model outcome
with respect to many of these parameters, see Table A3. Among the observed parameters is
the population size, which I set to N = 360, in accordance with the value of 362 thousand in-
habitants given in Table 2.21 I assume that income is distributed log-normally between y = 15k
CHF and y = 1, 000k CHF. The shape parameters correspond to the distribution of taxable
income at the household level in the canton of Zurich, as described in Section C.3. Accord-
ingly, the aggregate income of the households in my model amounts to 27.23bn CHF, close to
its ‘true’ value of 28.49bn CHF.
The average fiscal capacity follows from the mass of households in my model. It does not
depend on any equilibrium outcome variables, since it simply adds up the cantonal tax liability
of every household, divided by N . The observed average of the fiscal capacity in the canton
of Zurich is about 3,500 CHF.22 Note that for the calibration I use a lower value and set
FCavg = 3, 000 CHF per capita. This is done to put a cap on the payments to the group of
poor municipalities in the calibrated version.
The level of the publicly provided good consumed, gj, is given according to (6). It depends
on the expenditure on the publicly provided good, Gj, in both municipalities, as well as on the
degree of spillovers (σ, ν) and rivalry, ρ. Concerning the former, I assume that σ = ν, which
implies that the degree to which public provision spills out to the other municipality is the
same as the degree to which households from one municipality consume the good in the other.
To estimate the degree of spillovers and rivalry in consumption of the publicly provided good, I
broadly categorize the municipalities’ expenditure: The set of spillover-generating expenditure
categories consists of expenditures on health, culture and leisure, security, environment, and
traffic. Expenditure categories associated with a rather high degree of rivalry are health,
education and welfare. Table 2 gives the numbers. It shows that the rich municipalities tend
to spend more on goods that appear more likely to spill over to neighboring municipalities,
whereas congested goods (with an arguably relatively high degree of rivalry in consumption)
21Note that I use ‘inhabitant’, ‘tax payer’, and ‘household’ as synonyms, since in my model this is true: Every
household comprises one inhabitant who is a tax payer. Table 2, however, indicates that these are not identical
in reality.
222012 value, see the aforementioned “Handbuch Zu¨rcher Finanzausgleich”.
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Table A2: Model parameters.
Symbol Value Units
Households
Population N 360 k
Income
Aggregate income Y 27,230 million CHF
Household income y
Log-normal-distributed
· · ·with shape parameters µdist 3.7195
σdist 0.9789
· · · limits y 1,000 k CHF
y 15 k CHF
Subsistence levels
Public provision βg 10.75
Housing βh 0.50
Numeraire βx 5.00
Preference parameters
Housing γ 0.30
Public provision α
γ-distributed
· · ·with shape parameters a 1
b 49
· · · limits α 1
α 0
Housing market
Housing supply elasticity θ 1.00
Land size
Poor municipality L1 25 ·100 ha
Rich municipality L2 25 ·100 ha
Public provision
Spillovers σ, ν 0.20
Rivalry ρ 0.75
Fiscal equalization scheme
Average fiscal capacity FCavg 3 k CHF
Lower bound ` 0.95
Upper bound υ 1.10
Haircut τ 0.70
Cantonal tax scheme
‘Married’ rate, see Table 1
42
are supplied equally. The chosen values of σ = ν = 0.2 and ρ = 0.75 seem reasonable, though
I do not want to claim these levels are the ‘true’ values.
Housing supply is given by (A3). The available building areas of the two municipality groups
is set to L1 = L2 = 25 (·100ha), which corresponds to the building areas given in Table A1.
The price elasticity of the housing supply, θ, is set to 1. This value is not easily observable,
and the previous literature has typically used values of around 3 (see, e.g., Schmidheiny 2006b,
Calabrese et al. 2012, Kuhlmey & Hintermann 2016). In a recent, more elaborate study on
this topic, Saiz (2010) argues that for metropolitan areas a smaller value of around 1 (or even
lower) seems more appropriate.
The remaining parameters of the model, the preference parameters, are less accurately
observed. They are used to fit the model outcome as well as possible to the observed outcome
(while remaining in a plausible range). These parameters include the housing preference γ,
which is set to 0.3. This implies that once a household has paid for the subsistence consumption
levels, it wants to spend (1 − α) · 30% of the remaining income on housing – recall that α is
the share optimally allocated to the publicly provided good.
The preference for the publicly provided good, α, is assumed to be beta-distributed and
therefore limited to the interval [0, 1]. The shape parameters a = 1 and b = 49 imply the mean
of this distribution is a/(a+ b) = 0.02 and the mode is (a−1)/(a+ b−2) = 0. The subsistence
level of the publicly provided good is βg = 10.75. The proposed combination of the distribution
of α and the level of βg offers reasonable tax rate multipliers and consumption levels as will
become apparent in the next section.
The subsistence levels of the private consumption bundle (h, x) are set to βh = 0.5 and
βx = 5. These levels imply that in the baseline calibration (see Section 3.2), the poorest
household with an income of 15k CHF has to pay approximately 80% of its income for its
private subsistence consumption.
C.3 Income distribution
With its 1.6 million citizens the canton of Zurich is the largest of the Swiss cantons in terms of
population. Most of the population concentrates around the cities of Zurich and Winterthur.
The distribution of taxable income is released by the statistical office of the canton of Zurich and
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depicted in the upper plot of Figure A2. The mean income is m = 66, 360 CHF, the variance
v = 7, 080 CHF.23 On this basis, I specify a log-normal distribution with shape parameters
µdist ≡ log(m2/√v +m2) = 3.7159 and σdist ≡ √log (v/(m2 + 1)) = 0.9789. The pdf and cdf
of this distribution can be inspected in the lower plots of Figure A2.
D Additional Material
This appendix contains additional material such as the incentive compatibility of the baseline
calibration and the results of sensitivity analyses for the baseline calibration.
D.1 Incentive compatibility of the baseline equilibrium
For the calibrated version from Section 3, I test the incentive compatibility of my segregating
equilibrium. The preference relations actually behave as depicted in panel 2 of Figure A1. For
approximately one million combinations of y and α, I tested whether each of these households
achieves the highest possible utility if it resides in the municipality it is supposed to reside in.
Figure A3 shows that the utility difference between living in the supposed municipality and
the ‘wrong’ one is positive for each (tested) y-α-combination. The figure also reveals that the
households on the locus of indifferent households are indeed indifferent.
An equal test of the incentive compatibility is available for the median voting equilibrium
in each municipality. See Figure A4 to verify that the preferred tax rates of the households in
the y-α-space change monotonously, as expected, such that all households to one side of the
locus of median voters prefer higher tax rates and those to the other side prefer lower tax rates.
The upper plot shows the case of municipality 1, and the lower plot shows that of municipality
2. In both cases, the preferred tax rate is monotonically decreasing in y and increasing in α.
This is not easily visible for combinations of small income and preference levels. Figure A5
zooms into that area and shows that, as expected, preferred tax rates multipliers monotonically
decrease in y and increase in α in both municipalities.
23The officially reported mean of taxable income in 2013 was 66, 670 CHF (see “Gemeinde-
portra¨t Kanton Zu¨rich”, http://www.statistik.zh.ch/internet/justiz_inneres/statistik/de/daten/
gemeindeportraet_kanton_zuerich.html, last accessed June 2017). The difference of 310 CHF stems from
linearly interpolating the mass of households for every income bin reported by the statistical office, whereas
the official number uses the exact distribution of income to calculate this mean. I employ the estimated value
of 66,360 CHF for which I also have an estimate of the variance.
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Figure A2: Income distribution in the canton of Zurich 2013 (above) and the corresponding
estimated log-normal distribution (below) with equal mean and variance.
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Figure A3: Incentive compatibility of income and taste segregation.
The locus of indifferent households is marked by the edge of the surface for which the utility gain is zero. All
households to the right of this locus (i.e., with smaller levels of α) prefer to live in municipality 1, while all
households to the left prefer municipality 2. In mathematical terms, the figure plots V 1(y, α)− V 2(y, α) ∀ α <
α˜(y) ∀ y and V 2(y, α) − V 1(y, α) ∀ α > α˜(y) ∀ y, where α˜(y) is the locus of indifferent households (that is
shown in Figure 1).
D.2 Sensitivity analysis and additional material
This section contains the results of a sensitivity analysis for the baseline calibration from
Section 3.2: Table A3 reveals the sensitivity of the baseline calibration for varying most of
the imperfectly observed parameters; and Table A4 shows a calibration of a simplified model
to investigate the source of the problems with regard to the housing prices in the baseline
calibration. The section also lists additional material for the policy evaluations of Section 4
(Figure 2 and Table A5).
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Figure A4: Preferred tax rate multipliers in the y-α-space.
Note that for some households the preferred tax rate multiplier is negative, which would not be feasible as an
equilibrium. The two equilibrium tax rate multipliers in the baseline calibration are the preferred tax rates
of the households on the locus of median voters. Both are positive (as reported above). The negative values,
therefore, do not contradict the assumption of positive equilibrium values, but merely indicate that those
households prefer lower taxes.
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Figure A5: Preferred tax rate multipliers for a selection of households with small y and small
α values.
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Table A3: Sensitivity analysis 1: Assessing the sensitivity of the baseline calibration with
respect to (most of) the parameter values.
p t g N Y/N FES
Baseline See Table A2.
1 13.330 0.828 12.603 142.934 97.902 -1.787
2 13.352 1.137 17.407 217.066 60.980 1.456
Average
fiscal
capacity
FCavg = 3.5
1 13.309 0.749 12.627 157.835 86.718 -0.791
2 13.436 1.019 18.578 202.165 66.990 1.780
FCavg = 2.9
1 13.335 0.841 12.598 139.511 100.777 -2.019
2 13.337 1.156 17.131 220.489 59.734 1.408
Publicly
prov.
good
(σ = 0.1, 1 13.130 1.438 11.682 138.484 102.340 -2.032
ρ = 0.9) 2 13.128 1.714 13.559 221.516 58.947 3.485
(σ = 0.3, 1 13.444 0.488 14.603 143.882 96.809 -1.725
ρ = 0.6) 2 13.472 0.820 25.847 216.118 61.546 0.856
Housing
price
elasticity
θ = 1.2
1 10.325 0.824 12.647 138.992 99.860 -1.895
2 10.345 1.141 17.706 221.008 60.407 1.554
θ = 0.8
1 18.501 0.834 12.477 147.967 95.706 -1.669
2 18.504 1.131 16.588 212.033 61.636 1.216
Housing
preference
γ = 0.4
1 14.990 0.828 12.525 141.327 97.978 -1.792
2 15.002 1.133 17.146 218.673 61.202 1.362
γ = 0.2
1 11.340 0.829 12.712 145.255 97.824 -1.782
2 11.372 1.144 17.691 214.745 60.634 1.565
α-distri-
bution
(a = 1, b = 29)
1 13.457 0.894 13.062 131.637 120.477 -3.009
2 13.076 1.834 19.405 228.363 49.794 12.568
(a = 1, b = 99)
1 13.359 0.821 11.675 145.235 96.535 -1.712
2 13.374 0.973 14.106 214.765 61.508 0.941
Subsis-
tence lev-
el of g
βg = 11.5
1 13.319 0.863 13.354 142.749 98.084 -1.797
2 13.339 1.172 18.131 217.251 60.892 1.546
βg = 9.5
1 13.351 0.769 11.360 143.235 97.607 -1.770
2 13.373 1.079 16.201 216.765 61.124 1.307
Subsis-
tence lev-
el of h
βh = 0.7
1 13.876 0.840 12.445 161.997 84.935 -1.102
2 13.931 1.119 17.451 198.003 68.034 0.000
βh = 0.3
1 12.773 0.820 12.677 137.527 99.846 -1.895
2 12.819 1.138 18.121 222.473 60.676 1.650
Subsis-
tence lev-
el of g
βx = 7
1 13.160 0.830 12.472 142.549 97.741 -1.779
2 13.162 1.132 16.748 217.451 61.151 1.262
βx = 3
1 13.499 0.826 12.722 143.415 97.980 -1.791
2 13.539 1.142 17.984 216.585 60.846 1.626
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Table A4: Sensitivity analysis 2: Baseline calibration with homogeneous preferences, a linear
tax scheme, and no FES.
Municipality group Rich/Poor1
Symbol Rich Poor Units Cal. Data
Household distribution
Indifferent household 73.851
Population Nj 112.664 247.336 k 0.46 0.61
Average income Yj/Nj 117.046 35.519 k CHF 3.30 1.83
Median income 148.862 38.257 k CHF 3.89 –
Municipality characteristics
Housing price pj 11.510 8.310 k CHF/10sqm 1.39 1.58
Linear tax rate tj 0.067 0.094 % of y 0.72 0.77
2
Public consumption gj 101.911 73.146 k CHF/Nj 1.39 –
Public expenditure Gj/Nj 9.999 3.592 k CHF/Nj 2.78 1.06
1 “Cal.” refers to the baseline calibration presented here, and “Data” are observed values from Table 2.
2 This is for the (linear) tax multiplier on the (progressive) cantonal tax scheme.
The preference parameters to arrive at this equilibrium are α = 0.04, γ = 0.2, the subsistence levels are set to
βx = 10, βh = 0.28, and βg = 60, the publicly provided good is characterized by σ = 0.3, and ρ = 0.5. The
remaining parameters are as in the baseline calibration and summarized in Table A2.
In contrast to the baseline calibration presented in Section 3.2, this calibration abstracts from taste hetero-
geneity, progressive taxes, and the FES; except for spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption, it is close
to the taste-homogeneity version presented in Schmidheiny (2006b, columns 2 and 3 in Table 1). It intends to
illustrate that spillovers and rivalry are not the reason why the housing price is almost equalized in the baseline
equilibrium of the present paper.
Table A5: Changing the progressive tax scheme: Definition of the alternative schemes.
Baseline More progressive Linear
Taxable Tax Marginal Tax Marginal Tax Marginal
income liability tax liability tax liability tax
0 0 0 0 0 0 5.26
6.7 0 2 0 2 0.710 5.26
11.4 0.121 3 0.122 2 1.030 5.26
16.1 0.352 4 0.276 2 1.435 5.26
23.7 0.728 5 0.464 4 1.929 5.26
33.0 1.263 6 0.892 6 2.492 5.26
43.7 2.097 7 1.726 8 3.223 5.26
56.1 4.253 8 4.190 10 4.842 5.26
73.0 6.717 9 7.270 12 6.461 5.26
105.5 10.892 10 12.838 14 8.9 5.26
137.7 16.432 11 20.594 14 11.813 5.26
188.7 23.043 12 29.8 16 14.972 5.26
254.9 31.359 13 40.096 16 18.616 5.26
“Taxable income” implicitly defines the tax brackets. “Tax liability” denotes the amount of taxes payable for
the respective level of taxable income and the “Marginal tax” is the marginal tax rate in % for income levels
higher than the respective taxable income. Taxable income and the levels of tax liabilities are denoted in k
CHF.
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